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stateless Contenders and the Global Mythology

Yossi Shain
Tel -Aviv University

"Recognition 'has been a plaything for political
scientists who have taken delight in posing
abstract problems of a theoretical nature·. M'
This essay explores the dynamics of foreign support for
contenders who struggle over state power. It focuses. for purposes of theory. on governments' employment of diplomatic
recognition as a political mechanism to advance exiled aspirants
to power. By examining the theory of recognition in international
law as well as recognition practices in the political sphere especially vis-a-vis exiled contenders - the article seeks to
demonstrate the slippery nature of the concept of legitimacy in
international relations and to question the usage of the term as
an explanatory variable in world politics . As will be evident, the
acts of granting. withholding, or withdrawing recognition from
governments have little to do with the philosophical approval or
rejection of particular claims to power. although they are always
justified in such terms. Recognition is rather one among many
political techniques exploited by governments to further their
selfish domestic and international agendas. The value crtteria by
which conflicting claimants to power may be branded "legitimateM or "illegitimate. Mare constantly in flux. sampling from a
large storehouse of principles which are rhetortcally acknowledged by the international community as archetypes of legiti macy.
In order to demonstrate the elusive nature of legitimacy
and recognition. a wider range of historical interactions between
sovereign governments and governments-in-exile will be discussed. They include the European approach to the deposed
Russian government in the early 1920s; the Allied powers'
recognition of the dislodged governments-in-exile during the
Second World War: the short lived recognition of the Spanish
Republicans in the immediate postwar pertod: the Organization
of Afrtcan Unity's (OAU)recognition of anticolonial exiled libera tion movements. and some recent cases of recognition of governments-in -exile whose future is not yet known, including those in
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Afghanistan and Cambodia. and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Part one provides a broad definition of governments-inexile, and offers a preliminary classification of them in accordance with their respective claims to power. Part two examines
the relations between governments-in-exile and sovereign governments while evaluating both international law theories of
recognition and recognition practices. Part three discusses the
shortcomings oflegitimacy as an explanatory concept in international relations.
I. Definition

and Classification
Governments-in-exile can be defined as opposition groups
which struggle from outside their home territory to overthrow
and replace the regime in their independent or claimed home
country. These groups refer to themselves as government-inexile, national committees. provisional governments, national
revolutionary councils, national liberation movements. and in
other ways which reflect their claim to be the sole or at least the
most viable alternative to the existing home regime. As such they
vie for the support of their national constituencies at home and
in the diaspora. and appeal for international assistance. There
are other exile groups which, although similar in their ultimate
goals and opposition strategy. do not fall under the above
definition precisely because they do not make such total claims
to power. These groups usually advocate a democratic change in
their country and thus refrain from making claims to state power
before elections have taken place. Examples of such groups
include the Filipino exiled democratic opposition to Ferdinand
Marcos•. the Korean exiled opposition to Chun Doo Hwana. and
the exiled anti-Fascist opposition to Mussolini.•
Exile contenders who make total claims to power can be
generally classified into three major sub-groups in accordance
with their respective goals and the grounds on which they Justify
their quest for national and internationar support.
The first consists of groups that strive to overthrow and
replace their home country's native regime. They reject the
claims made by the current home regime to represent the
nations. but usually do not question the existence of the state or
Its boundaries. These exile contenders present themselves either
as a) lawfully-elected, and therefore the legitimate sovereign
power of their nation-state: or bl traditional. and therefore the
legitimate representatives of their national community: or c)
most authentic. thus the legitimate spokesmen of the national
interest (making no reference to previous governmental post6

uons).
The deposed Spanish Republican government -in-exile is
a classic example of the lawfully elected type. Since the Republicans' defeat in the Spanish Civil War, up until Spain's first postctvil war democratic elections on July 7, 1977, oflkials of the
exiled Republican government insisted on being acknowledged
as the only legally mandated Spanish government. Similar
clatms have been made since 1939 by representatives of the
dislodged Polish government-in-exile, still operating in London. 5
In general. deposed governments-in-exile try to prevent a complete break with the past. to maintain the old constitution
unimpaired, and ensure a sense of institutional continuity. Beneath this facade, however. there are often considerable struc tural and constitutional changes designed to overcome problems
ofleadership succession while abroad. In the case of the Spanish
Republicans. fierce rivalry while in exile between the last prime
minister of the republic.Ju an Negrin, and the minister of defense
in Negrin's government. Idalecio Prieto, regarding the legal
status of the last Republican government, delayed the establishment of a untfied Spanish government-in-exile until 1945, and
eroded the Republicans' prestige among the Western Powers
during the initial postwar period .•
Traditional claims are usually made by deposed exiled
monarchs, like the Bourbons. the Romanovs, the son of the
deposed Shah of Iran (who in exile proclaimed himself as Shah
Riza II). and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Royal Government of
National Unity founded in China following Sihanouk's overthrow
and the proclamation of the Khmer republic in 1970.
Groups which make claims for authentic representation
are usually led by a charismatic exile leader who promises to
transform the nation's ltfe. Examples include de Gaulle's challenge to Vichy in the name of "the soul of France," as he put it in
his famous broadcasts; Khomeini's anti-Shah exile campaign in
the name of "Iran and Islam," and since 1981, Masood Rajavi's
exiled Iranian Mujahedeen, fighting from Iraq (after they were
forced out of France in 1986) to unseat Iran's Islamic regime on
behalf of the "real revolutionary Iran."
Again, all the above-named groups engage in a struggle
against an indigenous home regime for the right to represent the
same nation-states. The vocabularies used by the various aspi rants to justify their claim to power is usually reflected in their
organizational makeup, in particular in the internal division
between the innermost core of the leadership and the groups'
prime loyalists. 1
The second category of governments-in-exile includes
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groups aspiring to statehood. They fight from outside their
claimed national tenitory to gain independent political status
inside an international order of sovereign states. These groups
can be termed pre-state self-determination-oriented or decolonization-oriented governments-in-exile . Examples include the
contending parties in the anttcolonial struggle in Angola; the
Basque government-in-exile seeking independence from Spanish rule; the Algerian government-in-exile, founded in Tunis in
1958 to replace the French colonial rule; the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). whose official title in the United Nations has
been changed (following the November 1988 Palestine National
Council's declaration of the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state) from 'PLO' to the 'State of Palestine's; and
finally. the Polisario Front, founded in 1973 as an alternative to
Spanish rule in the Western Sahara, and which since 1976 has
protested on behalf of the self-proclaimed SaharawiArab Democratic Republic (SADR) against the annexation of the Western
Sahara by Morocco. The Polisario's limited control over some of
SADR's claimed tenitories, however, makes its status as a
government-in-exile questionable.•
The third category of governments-in-exile is comprised
of deposed governments that struggle from abroad against a
foreign invader to regain political independence or tenitory lost
in a war. The London based Allied governments-in -exile during
the Second World War represent this sub-group best. They
included the governments-in-exile of Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland. Yugoslavia and Belgium.
It is possible that governments-in -exile will fall into more
than one of the above categories at different times during their
struggles . For example, when the invading countries endeavor to
abolish the independence of the occupied nations and to incorporate their people as part of the conqueror's own national
community. governments-in-exile of the occupied nation campaign to regain both political independence and self-determination. Such is the case of the 70 year-old Government of the
Ukrainian National Republic in exile, which since the Ukrainian
nation and soil were incorporated into the USSR in 1920, have
claimed to represent "the last free will of a sovereign Ukrainian
nation until such a time when a free and independent Ukrainian
state is restituted on Ukrainian tenitory. M•0 Likewise, the legations-in-exile of the Baltic states of LaMa, Lithuania and Estonia, continue to challenge the 1940 Soviet annexation of their
independent countries . The U.S . and British governments (like
many other western democracies) have never recognized the
8

1939 Molotov-van Ribbentrop pact, and continue to recognize
and fund the Baltic legations as the legitimate representatives of
their respective nations . Finally, under this category we can also
include the Tibetan government-in-exile in India, which, since
the Dalal Lama's flight from China in 1959. has been the driving
force behind the ongoing Tibetan struggle to reverse the incorporation of Tibet into China.
Other cases of exile contenders which engage in overlapping struggles are de Gaulle's Free French, and the Polish government-in-exile. The Free French contested Vichy's authority in
metropolitan France while fighting against German occupation.
The deposed Polish government-in-exile, which fought during
world the Second War for repossession of its authority from the
Soviet and German invaders , has, since 1945, been claiming to
be the sole voice of an "independent and democratic Poland." A
student of the Polish-government-in-exile
has noted that although it seems to have lost its raison d'etre in the postwar
period, its relentless fifty year campaign on behalf of Polish
emtgres supporting democratization "is in Itself, a unique phenomenon in the history of political emigrations. "1 1 It will be
interesting to see whether the London Poles continue to insist on
maintaining their claims to exclusive legal-democratic status in
the aftermath of the partially-free democratic elections in Poland
in June 1989.
From the above classification we can deduce four distinct
but related principles of Justification invoked by govemments in-exile to support their bids for international recognition. These
are: 1) the claim of a legal right to govern, which assumes the
legitimacy is conferred only through democratic elections and is
not attenuated with the loss of effective control; 2) the illegality
of occupation, which assumes the sacredness of territorial
integrity; 3) the right to self-determination; and 4) the right of a
nation to be represented by its authentic spokesmen.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the
question of whether or not self-proclaimed governments-in -exile
actually command the allegiance of the people they claim to
represent is beyond the scope of these classifications; although
the support of their alleged constituencies may be the most
critical factor in determining the validity of their claims and the
attitude of foreign patrons towards their struggles. It is possible.
however . that an obscure organization with no national roots will
decide to proclaim itself a government-in-exile (often as a challenge to other leading contenders) .
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II. Foreign Support and the Political Nature of Recognition

The ultimate goal of all governments-in-exile is to gain or
recapture political power. To that end they make great efforts to
mobilize their fellow nationals. at home and abroad. and to
obtain operational and diplomatic assistance from foreign sources
whose support they consider instrumental to their success.
Foreign operational support may include money. equipment,
arms, or even direct inteIVenUon of a patron government to
install the exiled contender in power. Diplomatic assistance
varies from declarative and symbolic gestures by minor international actors to full recognition by sovereign governments. As
indicated elsewhere. the degree of diplomatic support accorded
governments-in-exile does not always reflect commitment by
international patrons to subsequent operational needs. Limited
diplomatic acknowledgement may be followed by massive operational assistance whereas full diplomatic recognition may not
always be followed by effective rewards. In fact the level of
diplomatic recognition and the degree of operational support for
governments-in-exile are always contingent upon the patron
government's position in international politics, its changing
political/ideological objectives, and its calculated perception of
the benefit of using the exiles as pawns in foreign rivalries.' 2
Although operational aid may be the most critical factor
in helping governments-in-exile to achieve their ultimate desire
- governmental power - the issue at the heart of most of their
international campaigns is legitimacy; that is the international
acknowledgement of the validity of their claims. Like ruling
governments and other nonruling contenders, most exiled aspirants seek international approval to convince their national
constituencies of the validity of their cause. and to discredit other
rival aspirants as "illegitimate." As Inis Claude points out.
"emperors (or would-be emperors) may be nude. but they do not
like to be so. to think themselves so, or to be so regarded. "13
Governments-in-exile. therefore. ascribe vital importance to
diplomatic recognition which they consider and present as an
outward symbol of their revolutionary progress. However. exiled
contenders may continue to adhere to their claims and persist in
their political struggle even if their calls for recognition have not
been heeded. Indeed. most self-proclaimed governments-in-exile
must rest content with vague and tentative gestures by nongovernmental actors, whose importance they tend to exaggerate
in making up for the shortcomings of their peculiar "selflegitimizing" position.
In world politics governments cannot simultaneously
accord full diplomatic recognition to more than one aspirant to
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govern the same tenitortal entity. although two competing
aspirants may claim sovereignty over the same tenitory or the
right to represent a population ruled by another state. Hence to
this day the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile in Dharmsala.
India. challenges the Chinese claim that Tibet is an integral part
of China, and maintains that it is the sole legitimate government
ofTibet and its people."
Recognition of one contender as the sole representative of
a state automatically implies nonrecognition of competing claims
to govern the same state's tenitory. Such is the case regardless
of whether the recognized contender exercises or lacks effective
control over the state tenitory. Thus, governments which today
recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the official
mouthpiece of the self-proclaimed Palestinian state (whose
tenitory is now under Israeli control). will automatically reject
Israel's claim for sovereignty over the same territories, though
not necessarily the existence of the state of Israel itself. In cases
of domestic national rivalry over the right to sole representation.
foreign governments may also decide that none of the competing
aspirants (in power or in opposition) is qualified to be granted
recognition as the sole authority to rule without contesting the
continued existence of the state itself. The patron government
may therefore withhold recognition from all competing contenders until one of them satisfies its self-prescribed crtterta for
recognition. Governments which choose the route of withholding
recognition from all rival claimants also tend to advocate keeping
the target state's seat in international gatherings vacant. A
recent case demonstrating such complexity is England's decision to withhold recognition from all contenders for power in
Cambodia following the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. The British
government. which initially voted with the majority of the United
Nations member-states to prolong recognition of Pol Pot's dislodged government as the legal representative of Kampuchea,
later changed its position and declared that. "there was no
Government in Cambodia which it could recognize. "u Britain
thus derecogntzed Pol Pot. and at the same time denied recognition to the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrtn.
By and large, governments-in-exile are more likely to
obtain full diplomatic recognition when their prospective international patrons are predisposed to deny recognition to the
existing home regime. At least four broad and distinct (but
related) rationales may be invoked by ruling governments to
justify nonrecognition of toward other sovereign govemments: 1 •
1)They have come to power in an illegal manner, whether
by extra-constitutional means in an already established state
11

(coup d'etat, civil war, etc.), or by unilaterally declaring themselves rulers of states whose territory and people are already acknowledged to be part of another nation-state. An example of the
former instance is the early withholding of recognition from the
newly established Bolshevik regime by the governments of
France, Italy, and the United States. In the early 1920s the three
governments continued to treat "diplomats or consuls sent by
the tsarist or provisional governments of Russia as representatives of the Russian state. "11 The most notable example of the
latter case is the Western allies' postwar refusal to recognize the
government of East Germany which was declared a "non-entity"
on the ground that it governed a territory and bore a name for
which it had no legitimate claim. 18
2) They are perceived as "puppets or stooges, merely part
of other states' governmental structure. "1• The refusal of the
majority of U.N. member-states to recognize the Vietnamese
sponsored-government in Cambodia ts again a good illustration
of such a case. In general, the presence of an occupying force
increases the likelihood that a native home regime - especially if
it was installed by the occupier - will earn the reputation of a
puppet. Such instances, however, do not automatically entail
prolonged recognition of the deposed government at the expense
of the home regime. As always, recognition practices are determined by the changing political goals of the recognizing government. This is best exemplified in the changing policies of India
toward the rival contenders for power in Cambodia that accompanied the 1980 transition from the Janata administration to
Gandhi's government. Janata's non-aligned foreign policy was
manifested in India's decision to deny recognition to both Pol Pot
and the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin. India
thus objected to the seating of either delegation in the U.N. The
coming to power of Indira Gandhi, in January 1980, produced a
shift in India's policy. Although she was rhetorically committed
to the policy of non-alignment, Gandhi leaned toward the Soviet
Union (which she considered a more reliable friend of India than
the U.S.); on July 7, 1980, she announced India's recognition of
the Vietnamese-sponsored regime, an act which stirred broad
international condemnation oflndia by the United States, China
and most of all the members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). but which was welcomed by the Soviets.••
Even more illuminating is the fact that despite the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, its client-governments of Babrak Karmal. and Najibulha, respectively, continued to occupy the Afghan U.N. seat. Kabul's uncontested status in the U.N. which
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could be attributed. in the early period of the Soviet presence. to
the absence of a viable opposition contender, surprisingly remained unchallenged even after the consolidation of the Muj ahedeen U.S.-Pakistani sponsored seven-party exile alliance in
Peshawar."
3) They are labeled as representatives of states which are
founded on alleged "original sin" especially in their domestic
political composition. A classic example of this category is the
almost unanimous refusal of U.N. state-members to recognize
south Africa's apartheid government and its offspring independent homelands of Bophuthatswana.
Transkei. Venda, and
Ciskei. 22
4) The home government's annexation of other independent states is deemed unacceptable and 'unlawful'. The occupied
forces are denied recognition as governments of the occupied
territories on the ground that "military occupation by itself does
not confer title or extinguish a nation. Nor does a proclamation
of annexation so long as the claims of the occupying Power are
effectively challenged and remained unrecognized. "23 The refusal
of Great Britain and the U.S. to recognize the Soviet annexation
of the Baltic states is a case in point. The two countries still
continue to provide the aging representatives of the Baltic states
with diplomatic courtesies.
The denial of recognition of ruling governments on the
basis of these principles opens the door for non-ruling contenders, including self-proclaimed governments-in-exile. who ask for
recognition of their claims to be the sole and most genuine
alternative to the home regime. The mere existence of such exiled
contenders - even if they are operationally incapable ofreplacing
the home regime - may become. in and of itself, an important
factor in affecting the recognition posture of governments vis-avis the home regime: they may extend recognition to the exiled
contender as part of their strategy to undermine the home
regime. Non-ruling contenders who claim to represent sovereign
states may be recognized only as de Jure (and not as de Jactol
authorities, a distinction which implies that. from the standpoint
of patron governments rulership does not sanctify a "legitimate"
right.
International Law and the Changing International Mythologies
International law has developed a body of principles and
criteria for granting. withdrawing, or withholding recognition
among governments which are also applicable to relations between sovereign governments and self-proclaimed governments13

in-exile. There are three major approaches in this literature. The
"traditional approach" conditions recognition on the ability of the
recognized government to exercise effective control over its
tenitory by possessing the state's machinery; its propensity to
fulfill international obligations; and the degree of support it
receives from its claimed constituencies (without specifying a
particular form of goverrrment). The "Estrada doctrine," named
for the Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada, advocates the
elimination ofrecognition from diplomatic practice. It maintains
that only new states, not governments, should be recognized,
and condemns the practice of granting, withdrawing, or withholding recognition for constituting foreign intervention in other
states' domestic affairs. Finally. the 'Tobar /Betancourt approach," links recognition to democratic practices. It promotes
nonrecognition of goverrrments that come to power through extra
constitutional means until "a free election is held and new
leaders elected." The concept is also known as "automatic
nonrecognition."••
The various theories of recognition are mutually incompatible. Their notorious ambiguity and arbitrariness have earned
the law of recognition the reputation of being "the most maligned
and controversial branch of international law." 25 This situation
reflects the inability or unwillingness of governments to establish
clear and stable priorities among a number of principles of
"legitimation" to all of which lip service is paid by the international community. These principles, which gain preeminence at
different political conjunctions. promote. at least rhetorically,
themes such as self-determination, democracy and popular
consent. human rights. and nonintervention (or territorial integrity). The result, or perhaps the reason for the absence of unified
criteria for affording recognition in international law theory is
that all governments are free to adopt and interpret the doctrines
of recognition in accordance with their policy objectives and
ideologies. In practice, therefore, diplomatic recognition is no
more than a political mechanism exploited by governments to
advance or undermine conflicting claims to power in other states.
in an attempt to enhance their own interests (domestic or
foreign). 28 The exploitation of recognition ofrecognition in world
politics is particularly pronounced in the case of govemmentsin-exiles, which are accorded or denied recognition as the foreign
policy agendas of established governments dictate.
In the 19th century recognition was usually extended to
new governments once they satisfied the seemingly objective
criteria for effective control. In this century, especially since
1917, recognition is no longer automatically conferred on effec14

uve governments; it became imbued with ideological considerauons.• 1 In the early years of the 20th century. when legaldemocratic principles became enshrined. governments in increasing numbers had begun linking their recognition policies to
the political character of the target regime. The first institutionalization of democratic-legality as a principal guideline for recognition policies was the 1907 signing of the Central American
Treaty of Peace and Amity . The republics of Guatemala. Costa
Rica, El Salvador. Nicaragua and Honduras agreed. as a selfprotective measure. to deny recognition of "any other Government which may come into power in any of the five Republics as
a consequence of a coup d'etat ...or of a revolution against the
recognized Government. so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized
the country. " •e
The legal -democratic criteria dominated recognition
policies of many governments throughout the first half of this
century . Between the 1920s and the 1940s recognized governments-in-exile were for the most part governments deposed by a
native or a foreign regime . They were recognized as the legal and
dejure_sovereign power of their country. and were treated "as if
they were still ruling the state even though their government has
Jost effective control. "29 Prolonged recognition of deposed exiled
governments became a common practice especially during the
Second World War. In London and Washington. D.C .. exiled
governments and officials of countries occupied by Germany
.vere recognized as "the legal successor to the government which
(they) replaced. "3 0 a status which entitled them to full diplomatic
immunity and privileges. The governments-in-exile were empowered by the Allied Powers. through the Maritime Courts Act of
1941. to have jurisdiction over their fellow nationals residing in
the recognizing countries. This included the authority to maintain their own armies. to control their countries· assets abroad.
and the right to try their own national for certain specified
offenses (although they were forbidden "'to retain or imprison ...
any person .. . or a national' of that country . ... and had to rely on
British authorities and courts for enforcement of their statutes
and decrees . "31
Withholding recognition from an occupier or its native
surrogate. while at the same time prolonging recognition of a
deposed government. carried the message that effective control
over the territory did not confer "legitimacy." But the message
was not just symbolic. By treating the deposed governments as
if they were still ruling their countries, the recognizing governments sought to keep their exiled institutions - and especially
15

their defeated armies - intact as a living challenge to the home
regime, and to prepare them as designated rulers in the postwar
period . The Allied powers, using the legal-democratic principle to
justify their recognition of the deposed governments, were hesitant to grant similar recognition to Charles de Gaulle's Free
French which had no legal status prior to its creation. As
Krystyna Marek has noted, de Gaulle's claim to be the authentic
representative of all Frenchmen was insufficient to justify the
granting of full recognition, since "'peoples are not a subject of
international law and can therefore hardly be legally represented ."3 2 In fact, the United States, the Soviet Union, and even
Britain recognized Petain's government. and continued to host
Vichy's diplomatic officials until 1943 .33 The Free French's
official status, reduced to that of a "national committee". did not,
however. prevent the allies from bestowing on de Gaulle the same
diplomatic privileges enjoyed by other recognized govemmentsin-exile, or, for that matter, from granting his liberation committee massive operational assistance.
Recognition, is not. as M.J. Peterson has noted, "irrevocable once given ...,. As McDougal and Reisman have pointed out.
governments may elicit changing attitudes among other governments "akin to recognition and derecognition.""" The tentative
nature of recognition was manifested at the end of the Second
World War when the Polish government-in-exile was abandoned
by its Western allies. In 1943, when the great Soviet counteroffensive was already underway, Stalin broke off relations with
the Polish government -in-exile. The British government, fearful
of destroying the coalition with the Soviets, failed to stand by its
Polish allies. and when the Red Army reached Poland Stalin was
quick to execute his plan to install a government to his liking.
Stalin thus created a "Polish National Council" consisting of
Polish communists and nonentities and shortly before Yalta he
recognized the group as the Provisional National Government of
Poland. At Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt yielded on the Polish
question . They deserted the London Poles and eventually recognized the Lublin group as the future government of Poland. 36
In the postwar period legal-democratic principles dominated international political rhetoric. Today, a nondemocratic
regime, "feels compelled to shed its more authoritarian and
totalitarian traits in order to establish a popular image of
legitimate rule. "37 Furthermore, following the war the principle of
territorial integrity suffered an erosion in favor of "cosmopolitan"
morality. 38 By 1946 the United Nations- allegedly representing
a democratic world order - had already emerged as the prime
arbiter among legitimation principles used in granting global
16

approval and disapproval of conflicting claims to rule particular
states. The world community, in its charters and law (such as the
Declaration of Human Rights, and the genocide Treaty of 1948)
has acknowledged individuals. not only governments. as legal
entities in the eyes of international law, which means that the
domestic legal order of every state has become a matter of
concern for all mankind. Since the war. then. sovereignty is no
longer hailed as being morally sup~rior in its own right. and the
u.N.may even advocate military action to put an end to a state's
actions that it deems intolerable. 3 •
The first and perhaps most dramatic postwar attempt by
the international community to unseat an indigenous home
government in the name of the legal-democratic principle was the
General Assembly's labeling of Franco's fascist regime as a
potential threat to world peace . On December 12, 1946, the U.N.
adopted a resolution which barred Spain from membership in
the international agencies of the United Nations until democracy
was restored. The resolution also recommended a universal
withdrawal recognition from Franco's government. and authorized the Security Council to determine "within a reasonable time
.. . the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the situation."
This unusual resolution, however, was of limited effect without
the wholehearted support of the Western powers. By 1946 the
Great Powers were already immersed in the Cold War and the
British and U.S. governments preferred Franco's staunch anticommunism to the prospect of the return to power of the leftleaning Republican government-in-exile. The Western allies fell
short of breaking relations with Franco, and even France, which
ordered the closing of its border with Spain and made symbolic
gestures toward the Giral Republican government in Paris,
refrained from extending diplomatic recognition to the Spanish
government -in-exile. By 1947 only a handful of European and
Latin American governments granted diplomatic recognition to
the Spanish govemment-in-exile• 0 while the U.S. and Britain
saved face by maintaining
that despite the international
community 's obligation to democracy in Spain it was the Spaniards alone who could bring about a change of regime. As Louis
Stein, a student of the exiled Republicans, has pointed out,
despite the rhetoric of democracy "the idea of nonintervention
had been of service to Franco . . .. The demands of the Cold War
had made his anticommunism respectable. He had become the
pillar of strength and virtue in the campaign against the Soviet
Bloc (while) the Spanish Republicans had surely been betrayed
by their friend."., By 1950 the U.S., Britain and France had
already initiated an international campaign to remove the 1946
17

resolution, and called for the admission of Nationalist Spain to
the United Nations . Spain finally became a full member of the
U.N. in 1955, whiletheSpanishRepublicangovernment
-in-exile
rapidly lost the limited recognition it had previously enjoyed and
"ceased to have meaning to anybody outside of the exile itself. "•2
The international conventions which promoted the use of
outside inteivention to terminate human rights violations were
further developed in the U.N. anticolonial provisions. With the
growing wave of national liberation in Third World countries, the
idea of self -determinationitself an extension of the democratic
concept- became preeminent in the international community's
archetypes oflegitimacy. The growmg number of former colonies
gaining independence and membership in the U.N. moved the
organization to adopt the Decolonization Declaration (Dec. 14,
1960). which branded colonial rule inimical "to human rights
and (the) pursuit of peace ."43 It also declared "that all peoples
have the right to self-determination ..... Res 2621 XXV of October
12, 1970 extended this provision to "reaffirm the inherent right
of colonial peoples to struggle by all necessary means at their
disposal against Colonial Powers which suppress their aspiration for freedom and independence ."••
Since the early 1950s. therefore, most recognized governments-in-exile were no longer dispossessed governments trying
to prolong a de Jure international status, but rather aspiring
exiled contenders seeking to transform their self-proclaimed de
Jure status into de facto control of a given target territory. The
revolutionary Algerian government-in-exile (the Gouvernement
Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne or GPRA). established in
1958 in Tunis, was among the first to invoke anticolonialism to
challenge French sovereignty over Algeria. The GPRA claimed to
represent the Algerian people and it was consequently recognized by the Arab States, China, and the countries of the Soviet
bloc as the "legitimate" representative of Algeria . The Soviets
refrained from granting recognition, fearing a possible severance
of relations with de Gaulle's government.••
With the formation of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) in 1963, many self-proclaimed liberation movements
sought and gained recognition by African governments whose
countries had already gained independence . The OAU's special
Liberation Committee provided a forum for the new aspirants,
and its declared intention was to promote the most "legitimate"
contenders from the newly self-proclaimed nation-states . The
OAU's official criteria for recognition required the exiled contenders to demonstrate their effective struggle against the colonial
powers and to manifest their ability to muster popular support
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among their claimed constituencies at home. Although the
OAU's recognition policies were declared to be free of ideological
or political considerations, political motives and blocs dominated
some of the most crucial decisions of the organization. 47
The Angolan case is perhaps the most instructive example of the OAU's changing position in determining the most
"legitimate" contender to replace Portuguese colonial rule. In
Angola, Holden Roberto's self-proclaimed revolutionary exiled
government, the Govemo Revolucionario de Angola no Exile
(GRAE) vied for OAU's recognition with Dr. Agostinho Neto's
Movirnento Popular de Liberacao de Angola (MPLA).The GRAE
claimed to be "the only movement to represent the Angolan
people." while Neto maintained that the MPIA had acquired the
rtght to recognition as "the only one that was fighting the
Portuguese troops."•• Throughout the 1960s the OAU futilely
sought to create unity between the two contenders. It first
accorded recognition only to the GRAE, but the growing discontent among many OAU delegates with the GRAE's poor performance in the fight against the Portuguese, led to a reversal of this
position . In 1969, the OAU Liberation Committee voted for the
withdrawal of recognition of the GRAE, and after 1971 Holden
Roberto's organization was referred to as a government-in-exile
only by Zaire. Other OAUmember-states recognized the MPIA. ••
During the 1960s and again during the 1970s the OAU
Liberation Committee often faced requests for recognition and
operational aid from two or more political contenders aspiring to
represent the same nation, and the organization soon became
the supreme body in determining the "most legitimate" among
them. However, since many of the OAU member-states - as well
as the aspiring groups themselves - were recipients of either
Chinese or Soviet aid, recognition quickly became intertwined
with Sino-Soviet competition, and the OAU faced increasing
internal divisions. In a few cases the OAU in an attempt to avoid
alienating any of its patron powers, simultaneously recognized
two rival claimants. In the case of Namibia and South Africa, the
OAU recognized, respectively, both the Soviet-backed SWAPO
and the African National Congress (ANC)as well as the Chinese
sponsored South West Africa National Union (SWANU)and the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).••
The OAU's susceptibility to power politics in determining
recognition policies was further manifested in the case of Western Sahara, which was annexed by Morocco and Mauritania after
the termination of Spanish colonial rule. In 1976, the OAU
announced its intention to admit to membership the Polisario
Front as spokesmen of the self-proclaimed Saharawi Arab
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Democratic Republic (SADR).However, threats to withdraw from
the organization by King Hassan of Morocco and the President of
Mauritania, Mouktar Ould Dada. delayed any formal decision.• 1
It took eight years, during which the OAU experienced internal
divisions and intense disruption over the subject of Western
Sahara, until the majority of its member-states officially recognized the SADR In 1984 Polisario's representatives were invited
to take the SADR seat in the organization. Morocco immediately
withdrew its membership while Mauritania succumbed to the
pressure and recognized the new state-in-exile.••
The technique of recognizing a government-in-exile in an
attempt to undermine the ruling regime is not limited to cases of
self-determination or decolonization. It has also been exploited
by governments seeking to undermine regimes backed by occupying countries, and, in fewer instances, to discredit native
governments of independent states. Patron governments may
therefore encourage exile groups to unite their forces (or at least
to project a stronger image of unite) in order to make themselves
worthy of eventual recognition as the most viable alternative to
the home regime. During the Second World War, for example. the
British Foreign Office was provoked by two notable anti-Fascist
exile leaders. Luigi Sturzo and Carlo Sforza, to form and recognize an Italian government-in-exile - similar to the Free French
- to counter Mussolini. The search for an exile leader who could
unite the Italian forces, just as de Gaulle organized the French
resistance, was soon suspended when British officials in Europe
and the U.S. concluded that there was no such Italian figure
capable of establishing a respectable government-in-exile.• 3
Likewise, President Eisenhower, in the hope of overpowering
Castro in an exile-led operation, urged Cuban exile groups in
Miami to unite their forces and select a leader whom he could
recognize as Mthehead of a government-in-exile."-. Finally, the
Sudanese government attempted in 1965 to undermine the
neighboring government of Chad by proclaiming its intention to
recognize the government-in-exile formed by Chadian refugees
on its territory. However. discussions encouraged by the OAU led
to settlement of the Sudan's differences with Chad and to a
Sudanese promise to expel the refugees and stop aiding their
organization.••
The most recent development which demonstrating the
complexity of the use of recognition to undermine regimes
installed by a foreign invader is the refusal of a majority of U.N.
members to recognize the Vietnamese sponsored government of
Cambodia. preferring instead to continue to recognize the exiled
coalition government of Pol Pot. In 1979, when the Khmer Rouge
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were defeated by the Vietnamese invasion. most of its cadres fled
to Thailand. The Chinese government. facing the crushing of an
ally by Soviet-backed Vietnam, and Thailand, fearing the presence of Vietnamese troops on its border, refused to accept
Hanoi's victory. With the help of the Association of South East
Asian Nations and other U.N. member-states, they extended
recognition to the Khmer Rouge as Cambodia's legitimate government. The Thai and Chinese governments, also provided the
Pol Pot forces with operational bases and military aid to resist the
Vietnamese-backed government of Hun Sen. In the early 1980s
the U.S. also considered Pol Pot a convenient instrument in the
fight against Vietnam providing his forces with financial support
and doing little to counter the Khmer Rouge's official status. Now,
on the eve of the Vietnamese withdrawal (expected by Sept. 1989)
many governments are alarmed by the prospects of Pol Pot
returning to power, and are making efforts to encourage a new
coalition (which will exclude the Khmer Rouge) between the Hun
sen government and Prince Norodon Sihanouk. the most prominent exile contender in Cambodia's recent history.••
The use of diplomatic recognition of exile aspirants as a
weapon in undermining hostile indigenous governments of independent states was less frequent in the last decade . But this has
not prevented governments that maintain full diplomatic relations with native home regimes from openly trying to undermine
them by sponsoring their exiled opposition . For instance, throughout its war with Iran, the Iraqi government maintained full
diplomatic relations with Teheran. while at the same time
abetting the struggle of Khomeini's arch rivals. Masood Rajavi's
Iranian exile Mujhaedeen and sheltering its members. In July
1988, just a week before Khomeini's surprising acceptance of
U.N. Resolution 598, calling for the ending of the war with Iraq.
Rajavi made public his intention to set up, with the permission
of the Iraqi president. Saddam Hussein. a government-in-exile
"to administer 'liberated areas· of Iran en route to the takeover in
Teheran. ~ The cease fire on August 20, dealt a devastating blow
to Rajavi's hopes, for the Iraqis were quick to compromise their
erstwhile ally."' A similar case which demonstrates governments'
resent reluctance to exploit diplomatic recognition of their exiled
clients (as a political weapon in undermining rival regimes). is the
United State's continued diplomatic relations with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua while simultaneously openly aiding the exiled Contras in their struggle to overthrow the regime
in Managua. The newly apparent tendency to maintain diplomatic relations with enemy regimes may reflect a growing
acknowledgement among governments that a nonrecognition
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posture toward hostile governments or recognition of exiled contenders at their expense has proven to be ineffective or even
counterproductive technique. A critic of the U.S. nonrecognition
policy in Latin America, Africa and East Asia has observed that
the real victim of the practice Uhas been the global diplomacy of
the United States. When regular channels of official contact are
choked off, protection of United States interests and achievement of United States objectives becomes much more difficult. "•a
Other examples of this strategy abound. Hence despite
vast U.S. and Pakistani operational support of Afghan exile
rebels in their struggle to overthrow the Soviet-backed government in Kabul, the two governments stopped short of breaking
off official relations with the regime . Even after the proclamation
of the Afghan coalition government-in-exile on February 23,
1989, (whose formation had long been encouraged by the U.S.
and Pakistan) the self-proclaimed government-in-exile's call for
international recognition and the right to fill the nation's seat in
the United Nations remained unheeded. The State Department
announced that the U.S. would withhold recognition until the
government-in-exile obtained ucontrol over territory, a functioning civil administration. broad popular support, and (the) ability
to honor international obligations."•• In a sim1lar fashion, Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto excused her country's nonrecognition policy by proclaiming its commitment to the principle of
nonintervention: "We have not recognized it because we would
like respect paid to the Geneva accords. "80 Recent events in
Panama. however. indicate that the U.S. government has not
entirely dispensed with the use of recognition as a political tool
in undermining opponent regimes . Thus in March 1988, the
ousted exiled President of Panama. Eric Arturo Delvalle. was
recognized by U.S. officials as the lawful president of Panama. In
December 1988. Delvalle was received in the White House by
President Reagan and by the President-elect Bush as part of the
U.S. campaign to remove Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega from
power.•• In May 1989, after Noriega violently stole the elections
in Panama. the U.S. protested the fraudulent nullification of the
vote taking the unusual step of granting official recognition to the
opposition leader Guillermo Endara as Panama's presidentelect.•2
III. The Elusive Nature of International

Legitimation
We have thus seen that in world politics there is a large
pool of broadly interpreted principles interchangeably invoked
by governments to justify their recognition policies vis-a-vis rival
contenders to power in other states. The ideas of territorial
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1ntegrity (or nonintervention). self-determination, human rights,
legality and democracy can cancel each other out in instructing
recognition policies. A government installed by foreign invaders
may be labeled a puppet and may be denied recognition even
though it has consequently consolidated power independently,
while a deposed exiled contender may enjoy prolonged recognition despite its criminal human rights record and lack of popular
support at home. Governments that grant diplomatic recognition
and provide operational assistance to exiled contenders may
maintain that the principle of nonintervention ls inapplicable to
what they consider colonial possessions, unconstitutional ways
of acquiring power. or nondemocratic practices. Patron governments may even bestow recognition on a surrogate exile group
which they themselves created and which they then declare to be
authentic representatives of an alleged national constituency.
Since recognition practices are subsumed under tactical
considerations dictated by the patron's immediate interest, they
do not always match (at least in appearance) the overall position
of a government toward the contestants in other states' power
struggles. On the one hand, recognition does not entail any
additional commitment by the patron government. Thus a government which officially rejects the legitimacy of ruling authorities and affords de Jure recognition to its exiled opponents may
at the same time have a strong connection with the unrecognized
authorities in the form of litigation, trade and exchange of
travelers. As Leon Lipson. a scholar of international law. has
pointed out. the advantage of recognition d.efactoover recognition
de Jure lies in affording the opportunity for "gradation of treatment. "•3 On the other hand. governments that provide massive
military aid to assist exiled claimants to power may at the same
time withhold diplomatic recognition from their clients. They
may maintain full diplomatic relations with a rival home government in order to maintain close ties with domestic developments
and to have easier access to intelligence channels which require
stable diplomatic relations. Pakistan's policy towards the Afghan
rebels self-proclaimed government-in-exile is an extreme illustration of political hypocrisy in which a sponsoring government
exploited the idea of nonintervention to justify nonrecognition of
its exiled clients . Pakistan has justified its military assistance to
the Afghan exiles as a humanitarian relief effort, while referring
to its exiled clients as "refugee organizations."
The attempt to translate the tentative nature of recognition in the political realm into the language of international law
by invoking the distinction between de Jure and de facto is
unpopular among many international law students. One of them
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has warned that those who are resorting to the usage of dejure/
de facto to describe international relations are "committing
atrocities of analysis ."•• Scholars and practitioners who have
sought to free recognition from political and ideological considerations have long advocated the limitation of recognition only to
states, based on the supposedly objective criterion of effective
control. However, as Peterson, another international law student. has pointed out recognition of governments is here to stay,
since "states are abstract entities capable of acting only through
some human agent. and the government is that agent. "Thus. she
concluded, relations between states can never be free from
"emotional reaction or political calculation ."•5 Indeed, even recognition of a non -existing aspiring state. such as the newly selfproclaimed state of Palestine, implies recognition of the right of
those who declare the state to exist - in this case the PLO - to also
speak on Its behalf, and thus, by extension. recognition of a
government.••
The unstable nature of recognition is especially clear in
the case of self -proclaimed governments -in-exile whose existence is by nature tenuous. Since they are usually treated by
sovereign governments not as players but as playing cards, we
must ask ourselves how recognition may advance the exiles' final
goal. In general. the conflict over who has the right to govern a
state is determined by the state's constituencies at home (and to
a lesser degree in the diaspora community). as well as by foreign
actors who strive to seat or unseat other states· governments in
order to enhance their own political interests. They all throw their
support behind a particular contestant whom they tend to
declare the most "legitimate" aspirant. Whethergovernments-inexile are fictional entities or serious contenders is a function of
their ability to obtain the loyalty of their state's constituencies at
the expense of other contenders for power (especially the home
regime). and to mobilize foreign support for their ultimate goal.
The success or failure of exiled contenders in mobilizing national
support may affect their campaign in the international sphere
and vice versa . On the one hand, foreign support ls likely to
decline over time as governments come to realize that the home
regime ls stable and not apt to be seriously affected by domestic
reslstance.• 1 On the other hand. foreign support is likely to rise
with the renewed popularity of the exiled contender at home. We
must remember, however, that diplomatic recognition is only one
among many factors. neither sufficient nor necessary, to determine the final outcome of the exiles· struggle .
Until the end of the Second World War. as long as there
was no "authoritative" body to acknowledge and interpret ques24

uons of regimes· legitimacy. recognition practices reflected the
patron government's self-prescribed ideological and political
criteria. The consistent refusal of Mexico to acknowledge the
legitimacy of Franco's regime, and Mexico's prolonged recognition of the Spanish Republican government-in-exile (in the face
of domestic pressure to accept the Nationalist government in
Madrid. and despite the changing international climate in favor
of Franco).•• may be regarded as one of the most genuine
expressions of support for legal-democratic principles in this
century. ••The recognition of the deposed Russian governments
in the early 1920s. however. had more to do with the European
governments' ideological and political dislike to the Soviet authorities than with genuine endorsement of the legality of the
deposed bodies. 10
The postwar formation of the United Nations was intended to provide a global remedy for the subjugation of principles of legitimacy to political considerations. The U.N.'s ascribed role as "custodian of collective legitlmacy" 11 aimed at
providing universal approval followed by international assistance to ]ust" causes and global repudiation and resistance of
"evil." However. the evidence of the last decades indicates that
rather than upholding genuine philosophical criteria of international justice. the U.N. practice of recognition reflects the crude
interests of its more powerful member-states. The U .N.. it may be
argued. institutionalized the practice of cloaking strategic interests with the banner of international morality. Because the U.N.
was intended to be the representative of a world democratic
order. it was endowed with the power to facilitate the claims to
power of non-ruling aspirants whose cause it deems legitimate.
and who therefore become authorized recipients of international
aid as authentic representatives of their populations. Thus.
recognized exile claimants. like SWAPO. ANC, PAC and the PLO,
ertjoy most of the diplomatic privileges accorded to sovereign
governments and have access to the treasuries and armories of
the U.N. donor countries. Unrecognized home regimes. on the
other hand. are usually excluded from the work of international
organizations. denied their benefits. and are often forced to
conduct their international relations - diplomatic, economic,
and cultural - "at a clandestine. non-governmental level."12 In
the case of Cambodia. the continuous recognition of the deposed
DK exiled coalition government at the expense of the Hanoiinstalled government of the Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) - has
prevented the latter from drawing upon U.N. programs to
strengthen its domestic political position.
Recognition of exiled claimants in the U.N. has been
13
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particularly important in cases where governments-in-exile
granted the authority to monitor and direct the relief effort of a
large diaspora community in refugee camps. In these cases the
money allocated by the U.N. agencies for medical care, food. and
shelter has often been exploited politically be exile contenders
who run these caps. Hence. the fact that Pol Pot's exiled Coalition
government of Democratic Kampuchea has its flag in the U.N.
has authorized the Khmer Rouge to have total control over
refugee camps in Thailand. Moreover. since the Thai government
did not apply its own laws within the camps, their inhabitants
have become totally dependent on the Khmer Rouge forces, and
are retained through disinformation, propaganda sessions. fear
and retribution. 74
Recognition of an aspirant exile group may also have a
critical effect in determining the balance of power within broad
exile coalition. Due to their peculiar position. exiled governments
are often beset with factionalism. Recognition and its side
benefits may be a prime incentive on the part of the coalition
members to preserve unity. The failure of the Giral governmentin-exile to mobilize international recognition eroded the already
fragile Spanish Republican unity and provoked some exiled
Republican leaders to abandon the legal camp in an attempt to
form a more viable coalition against Franco. 75 Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, who had been criticized for allying himself with the
Khmer Rouge in the exiled Cambodian coalition government.
defended his decision as the only possible way to acquire
international recognition:
"We would like to be separated from the Khmer
Rouge. We would like to form a nationalist government without the Khmer Rouge. But how can
we form a nationalist government outside the
legal framework of Democratic Kampuchea because Democratic Kampuchea is the legal entity;
it is still the full member of the U.N. If we don't
accept the legality of Democratic Kampuchea, we
cannot be recognized by the U.N. and ifwe are not
recognized by the U.N.. we might just protest
against the Vietnamese in the streets. in front of
the U.N. No. ifwe want to be helpful to Cambodia,
we must have at our disposal the U.N. platform.
We can speak out against the Vietnamese. and get
legal and official support from the U.N."1 •
Finally. a critic of the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the Afghan
self-proclaimed government in exile has argued that "Withholding recognition inadvertently destabilizes the Mujahedeen coa26

lition. It encourages clashes between traditional rivals. fosters
manipulative competition by factions, . . . and discourages
defections from the Soviet puppet government in Kabul. "11
One may argue that when patron governments fail to
provide operational support above declarative aclmowledgement. exiled contenders may fall victim to political rhetoric and
may Macguire an illusion of importance which becomes selffulfilling . "1 • In the early 1970s a leading student of African
politics who examined the position of SWAPO of Namibia
remarked that, the U.N. recognition of the exile struggle created
M
false hopes and inhibited nationalist initiative, only finally to
leave exile Namibians further from power and thus more
frustrated and dependent than they had been before the United
Nations assumed responsibility for their cause. "1 • However, one
must also remember that in world politics institutions are what
they are largely because of what certain people think, feel and
say about them . Hence, the recent pact concerning Namibia's
independence and the expected withdrawal of South African
forces may demonstrate - if and when the agreements are
carried out- that the continuous presence of SWAPO in the U.N.
has been the most valuable asset in SWAPO's ability to capture
power inside Namibia.• 0
As some of the examples given above demonstrate there
is no integral connection between the U.N. decision to confer
recognition upon an aspirant. and the moral validity of the
aspirant claim. As Inis Claude profoundly remarked, the critical
question Misnot what principle is acknowledged but who is
accepted as the authoritative interpreter of the principle, or to
put it in institutional term how the process of legitimation
works ."•1 Although U.N. decisions and declarations are presented in the name of the Mworldcommunity." they represent no
more than the will of interlocking blocs which provide the
majority vote needed to control the interpretation and boundaries of fundamental principles oflegitimacy. AsJeaneJ. Kirkpatrick has pointed out, in the U. N. Macontinuing political struggle
is waged to control the definition of key terms (and the)
description of reality. What are human rights? Who is abused?
What is aggression? Who is the aggressor and who is the victim?
What is a national liberation movement -who is liberated, who
is subjugated?When is a force legitimate, when is it illegitimate?
All are 'decided ' by majority vote. "u
Thus despite the fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits the
acquisition of territory and the annexation of people by means
of force, a majority of governments has avoided challenging the
annexation ofTibet by China, and have denied recognition to the
27

Dalal Lama's Tibetan government-in-exile even though it has
enjoyed the overwhelming support of Tibetans in the diaspora
and under Chinese occupation. At the same time, Pol Pot's
criminal DK exiled government has been granted recognition as
the authentic representative of the people of Cambodia, on
whom it has been perpetrating genocide.
In conclusion, although the U.N. set out to replace power
and ideological politics with universal moral principles, in its
practice of recognition it has often succeeded only in obscuring
the concept of legitimacy. If there is any hope of establishing a
genuine and reliable set of principles of international justice, we
must begin by separating the language of recognition from that
of legitimacy.
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